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Abstract
Within the economic profession, it is a widely held view that the fiscal criteria of the
Maastricht treaty are arbitrary numbers without economic foundation. Much of this
criticism seems to overlook an important aspect - the strategic dimension of the
criteria. This paper focuses on one particular question out of this broad strategic
complex: How do the criteria change the fiscal bargaining situation on the national
level? For this purpose, a bargaining game between a national finance minister and
an interest group over budget consolidation is designed. The purpose of this paper is
twofold: On the one hand the analysis should contribute to a better understanding of
the strategic effects of the fiscal criteria in the pre-EMU period. On the other hand it
is to provide insights helpful for the construction of credible and strategically
consistent debt limits in the time after the introduction of the Euro.
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Nontechnical Summary:
Within the economic profession, it is a widely held view that the fiscal criteria of the
Maastricht treaty are arbitrary numbers without economic foundation. Much of this
criticism seems to overlook an important aspect - the strategic dimension of the
criteria. This paper focuses on one particular question out of this broad strategic
complex: How do the criteria change the fiscal bargaining situation on the national
level? This focus is motivated by the observation that the convergence criteria in
both applications - both as EMU entrance barrier and as an element of the Pact for
Stability and Growth - have the function to change the outcome of budgetary
bargaining on the national level.
At first, there is a short description of the role of so called "boundaries" in
bargaining situations. The fiscal criteria can be interpreted in this context because
they fulfil the defining characteristic of a boundary: In case that the counterplayer
crosses a more or less arbitrarily set boundary this provokes massive sanctions.
Apart from that, the fiscal criteria can also be interpreted as signals in fiscal games
with asymmetric information.
After this introduction, a bargaining game between a national finance minister and
an interest group over budget consolidation is designed. In this game, the finance
minister uses the threat of an EMU postponement to force the interest group to
support budget consolidation. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the credibility
of this threat are derived under assumptions of both complete and incomplete
information. A credibility indicator is constructed. Furthermore, statements
concerning the possibility of an actual postponement are made.
The results of this specific consolidation game are helpful to clarify the conditions
for the effectiveness of a certain type of conditionality in a more general way: If a
government’s opponents do not give up resistance to reforms, they are punished by a
delay of economic integration. The above results hint on the necessary constellation
for such conditionality to work: First, government’s opponents must have an interest
in integration. The benefit from integration for the interest group in question must be
large enough to compensate for the losses that are associated with giving up
resistance to reform. Second, a government using that kind of threat must be
inherently credible. Credibility is seriously undermined if the government itself is
heavily eager for integration. A further insight from the consolidation game is worth
to be marked: There is nothing endogenous in this type of bargaining that would
lead to a long postponement or even a complete failure of integration. Thus the
hypothesis, that a delay of EMU leads to failure necessarily, is not grounded on the
strategic aspects of the consolidation game and must be motivated differently.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze:
Die fiskalischen Kriterien, die sowohl der Entscheidung über den EWU-
Teilnehmerkreis als auch dem Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt zugrunde liegen,
haben in der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Analyse eine überwiegend kritische
Bewertung erfahren. Ein zentraler Vorwurf besteht darin, daß es sich bei den
Grenzwerten um willkürlich festgelegte Größen handelt, die wenig aussagefähig
sind etwa im Hinblick auf die Frage der Tragfähigkeit von Staatsverschuldung.
Zum Teil scheint diese Kritik einen wichtigen Aspekt zu übersehen: die strategische
Dimension der Kriterien. In diesem Beitrag soll dieser noch zu wenig beachtete
Aspekt der Fiskalkriterien im Rahmen eines Verhandlungsmodells beleuchtet
werden. Dieser Ansatz ist dadurch motiviert, daß die Fiskalkriterien in ihren beiden
Anwendungen - EWU-Kandidatenkür und Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt - vor
allem die Funktion haben, die Ergebnisse von Budgetverhandlungen in den EU-
Staaten zu verändern. Die Verhandlungsmacht von um Einsparungen ringenden
nationalen Finanzministern gegenüber sich widersetzenden Interessengruppen soll
durch diese exogenen Vorgaben gestärkt werden.
Vor diesem Hintergrund wird zunächst dargestellt, welche Rolle sogenannte
„boundaries“ in Verhandlungen spielen. Dabei handelt es sich wie bei den
Fiskalkriterien um mehr oder minder willkürliche Grenzen, bei deren
Überschreitung es zu massiven Sanktionen kommt. Des weiteren werden die
Fiskalkriterien als „Signale“ in fiskalischen Auseinandersetzungen mit
asymmetrischen Informationen interpretiert.
In der Modellierung werden dann die Verhandlungen zwischen einem
Finanzminister und einer Interessengruppe dargestellt. Der Finanzminister macht
Gebrauch von der Drohung einer EWU-Verschiebung für den Fall, daß die
Interessengruppe sich einer Konsolidierung widersetzt. Unter verschiedenen
Annahmen über die Informationsstruktur des Spiels wird gezeigt, welche
notwendigen und hinreichenden Bedingungen erfüllt sein müssen, damit die
Sanktionsdrohung des Finanzministers glaubwürdig sein kann.
Glaubwürdigkeitsindikatoren werden abgeleitet.
Außerdem ergeben sich Aussagen über die Möglichkeit einer Verschiebung: Es
zeigt sich, daß aus der Spielsituation heraus eine Verschiebung bei vollständiger
Information über die Eigenschaften des Gegenspielers nicht möglich ist. Erst bei
unvollständiger und asymmetrischer Information kann es zu einer strategisch
motivierten Verschiebung kommen. Der Finanzminister erhält durch eine
Verschiebung die Möglichkeit, die Interessengruppe von seiner tatsächlichen
Entschlossenheit zu überzeugen.
1"The clock for the Euro will not be stopped",
Helmut Kohl, German Chancellor, June 1997.
"3.0 means 3.0",
Theo Waigel, German Finance Minister, in early 1997.
1 Introduction
The fiscal criteria in both the EMU qualification process and the Pact for Stability
and Growth are far from popular in the economic analysis. A widely held view is
that the limits of 3 percent for the deficit-GDP-ratio and of 60 percent for the debt-
GDP-ratio are arbitrary numbers without economic foundation. According to this
view the criteria are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the
sustainability of a given debt position. Another line of criticism rejects the necessity
of debt limits even of a refined kind. Given the independence of the European
Central Bank and the prohibition of any central bank credit to European
governments - both elements unequivocally stated in the Maastricht Treaty -
financial markets can be expected to control fiscal policy. In this view the fiscal
criteria restrict fiscal flexibility without economic justification and, consequently,
are an unnecessary burden for the European economy.1
Without elaborating these issues any further the idea of this paper is to shed more
light on a neglected aspect - the strategic dimension. While strategic issues are very
present in the political debate they do not seem to be adequately taken into account
in the scientific analysis of the convergence criteria. This absence may have led to
misunderstandings and to premature conclusions concerning the evaluation of the
criteria. Taking into account the strategic dimension means to look how the fiscal
criteria could modify the relative bargaining power of different players and thus
change the equilibria in different bargaining situations. Aspects such as the
credibility of the 3.0-commitment or the uncertainty about EMU’s prospects after a
postponement are at the heart of the political discussion. If the new equilibrium -
after the introduction of these debt limits - is preferable to the situation before, this is
                                          
1
 Take for example the influential and very sceptical analysis of the fiscal criteria by Buiter,
Corsetti and Roubini (1993).
2an argument in favour of the criteria no matter how arbitrary the design of the
criteria is. This already hints on the fact that some of the cited criticism might
simply miss the point.
The Maastricht criteria have changed the environment in a way that is relevant to the
outcome of numerous games being played in the real world: Until May 1998 the EU
governments are playing a thrilling game on EMU membership. Financial markets
and European governments are playing a game concerning the expectations on the
stability of the Euro. On a constitutional level there is a game going on concerning
the design of the optimum contract restricting European fiscal politicians in the
proceeding integration process.
However, presumably the clearest example of the relevance of the fiscal criteria is
the game that has been played in the last few years between national governments
and interest groups over budget consolidation. The criteria have been the most cited
argument in all EU countries in governments’ attempts to carry through
consolidating measures heavily opposed by interest groups. It is this consolidation
game whose structure and equilibria will be analysed in detail in the subsequent
sections. The purpose is not only the better understanding of the pre-EMU period
but also to derive conclusions for effective debt limits after the introduction of the
Euro.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2 there is a short review on the
function of clearly stated restrictions in games and negotiations. In section 3 the set-
up of the consolidation game between the government and an interest group is
described. In the succeeding section 4 the equilibrium outcome is derived assuming
complete and symmetric information. In section 5 a credibility indicator is
constructed. The consequences of asymmetric information - the interest group has
no certainty about the determination of the government - are analysed in section 6.
In the final section the results are summarised and conclusions are drawn.
2 The Fiscal Criteria as "Boundaries" and "Signals"
Flexibility can be bad. This is a central insight from bargaining theory. Committing
oneself means strengthening one’s bargaining position relative to the other party. In
negotiations "being able to make commitments while your opponent cannot means
that you have much of the bargaining power. This is, in Thomas Schelling’s words,
the paradox that the power to constrain an adversary depends upon the  power to
bind oneself " (McMillan, 1992, p. 54). These statements might seem paradox
because commitment is reducing flexibility of action. Flexibility, however, is not
beneficial during negotiations: "It is good to have a wide range of choice over what
3position you are going to commit to. It is good to have flexibility before the
negotiations begin, but to be inflexible during the negotiations" (McMillan, 1992, p.
54).
A finance minister trying to impose tough budgetary cuts against the resistance of
well organised interest groups will have a better chance of success if his
determination is beyond doubt. In this respect it becomes clear that an analysis of
the fiscal criteria not taking into account strategic issues is incomplete and
misleading. It seems to be one of the most important purposes of the convergence
criteria to limit flexibility of agents in order to change the bargaining results of fiscal
processes. A national finance minister whose determination had been far from
credible in the past finds himself in a completely changed bargaining position vis-à-
vis interest groups after the introduction of the criteria.
The fiscal criteria are a typical example of a "boundary" (Schelling, 1960). A
boundary is a sharply and unequivocally defined trigger point for a painful counter-
reaction. In military conflicts a boundary is usually defined geographically. One
party preannounces that if the enemy crosses a certain border there will be a heavy
dose of retaliation. This example makes clear that the simple and unequivocal
definition of the Maastricht criteria is a defining characteristic of a boundary. The
preannounced counter-reactions in the Maastricht context are the postponement of
EMU and - in the context of the Pact for Stability and Growth - pecuniary fines.
Interpreting the fiscal criteria as boundaries the reproach of arbitrariness is simply
not relevant. Arbitrariness and a strong discontinuity of behaviour are absolutely
normal characteristics of a boundary. Clearness and credibility are necessary
elements of a boundary, not some kind of scientific foundation.
Another interpretation is helpful to illuminate the strategic meaning of the fiscal
criteria - looking at these limits as "signals". Signalling games are characterised by
asymmetric information. The sender has characteristics that are not observed directly
by the receiver. The signal is a message sent out by the sender. The receiver of this
message can draw conclusions over the hidden characteristics of the sender. One of
the best known economic application of this concept is Spence’s (1973) model on
job market signalling. In this model, the signal is the level of education a worker
acquires. This level contains information on the worker’s productivity. Acquiring
education is costly and these costs are lower for high productivity than for low
productivity workers. It is important to note that in the basic job-market signalling
game the signal education does not need to have any effect at all on productivity in
order to perform the information function.
Fiscal criteria of the Maastricht treaty can easily be interpreted by the same kind of
reasoning: The member countries of EMU are to be chosen. In order to safeguard the
stability of the new currency, only countries shall be accepted that have fiscal
institutions compatible with non-excessive deficits. These fiscal institutions cannot
4be assessed directly due to the complexity of this issue.2 Instead a signalling game is
constructed. The signal is the fiscal performance of a country relative to the
Maastricht criteria. Fulfilling the criteria is costly and these costs differ between
"stable" and "instable" countries. For a stable country it should be easier to send out
the signal "deficit below 3 percent" than for an instable country. In this signalling
context it can be shown again that the arbitrariness reproach is not relevant: It is not
important whether the criteria themselves are direct conditions for fiscal stability or
not. What is important for the function of the fiscal signalling game, however, is
merely that the criteria’s design makes fulfillment easy for stable countries and
difficult for instable countries.3
For the function of both a boundary and a signal credibility is essential. It is not
sufficient that a finance minister preannounces sanctions in case a given target is not
reached. This preannouncement must be supplemented by proofs of a clear
commitment. A typical way to commit oneself is to make a threat binding through
handing the sanctioning over to a third party. In this respect in the Maastricht Treaty
a standard commitment device has been applied by making the fiscal limits an
external constraint backed by European law. Not the national government alone has
to decide on sanctions but the institutions of the EU according to the rules of the
Treaty.
In spite of this commitment it is obvious that the credibility of the EMU exclusion
threat is not perfect. First of all the debt and deficit limits have a wide margin of
interpretation - due to the clauses surrounding the precise numbers. Secondly, the
decision on EMU membership and pecuniary fines is not completely external
because the same politicians fighting for consolidation domestically decide on
sanctions within their responsibilities in the EU council. Thirdly, there are risks
associated with the sanctions. If a country must not enter EMU or EMU is
postponed altogether there could be reactions on financial markets risking the
project altogether. Interest groups building rational expectations see that the EU
council deciding on the sanctions later on will take into account these risks. If these
risks are excessive the sanction threat is not credible. Stated in the game-theoretical
terminology: In this case the strategy involving sanctions is not subgame-perfect.
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 There is a fast growing literature on the dependence of fiscal performance on constitutional
institutions, political variables and budgetary procedures, see Alesina and Perotti (1996) for an
example.
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 The success of most of EU countries to reach at least the deficit criterion hints to the type of
equilibrium in this signalling game: It is a pooling equilibrium where the signalling has not led
to a separation of different groups of countries. Of course, there is also the following optimistic
interpretation: Almost all EU states today have already fiscal institutions compatible with non-
excessive deficits.
5In the following model these considerations will be analysed in a more formal way.
The purpose of this formalisation is to put more precision to concepts such as
bargaining strength and credibility in the context of the criteria. The approach will
be based on the interpretation of the criteria as a boundary in a bargaining context.4
3 The Consolidation Game
There are two players in the consolidation game: the finance minister (FM) and an
interest group (IG). Both are bargaining over budget consolidation. FM can be seen
as the personification of the fiscal authority of a country. While thus the influence of
FM is not controversial the power of a single interest group concerning budgetary
policy may rise questions. There are two interpretations behind this construction:
Either this interest group can be regarded as the typical one in a country with
numerous but homogenous interest groups, or this interest group is the interest group
having the decisive median position within a field of many interest groups that are
characterised by single-peaked preferences analogous to the standard median voter
models (Mueller, 1989). In comparison to the complexity of real world’s budgetary
procedures this two player setting may appear simplistic. However, it is sufficient to
work out the important features of the EMU game.
IG and FM are interacting in rent seeking activities: FM offers subsidies favouring
IG and is paid by IG in form of votes mobilised by IG. These rent seeking activities,
however, have consequences for the budget balance. The higher the level of
subsidies the higher the deficit.5
Now FM tries to consolidate. Consolidation is only possible if IG accepts it. Against
the opposition of the median or typical intererst group, FM would not have the
political support necessary to consolidate. "Consolidation" can stand either for
simply bringing down the deficit temporarily or for changing the fiscal constitution
in order to safeguard the consolidation permanently. In any case consolidation is
costly for IG. A reduction of the deficit implies a reduced level of subsidies.
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 The signalling concept will not be evolved further in this paper. See Drudi and Prati (1993) for an
interpretation of the fiscal criteria in the context of signalling debt sustainability.
5
 This relation holds as long as both tax and deficit finance have increasing marginal political
costs. Thus the financing for an increase in subsidies will be split between an increase in taxes
and an increase in deficit. For this kind of reasoning, see for example Abrams and Dougan
(1986).
6Why should IG accept consolidation? Here EMU comes in. FM poses the following
threat: Either IG accepts the consolidation that is compatible with a deficit of 3.0
percent or EMU will be postponed. "Postponement" can have two different
meanings: It can either stand for the case in which EMU starts on schedule but the
country in question misses qualification. Or it can stand for a postponement of the
EMU project altogether. Because of the first interpretation, the postponement threat
is not unrealistic a priori even if a postponement of EMU as a whole has never been
possible.6 It might appear as a contradiction to the Maastricht Treaty that the
national FM has the right to decide on the postponement issue since this lies in the
realm of the European Council. This view is treated in section 4 as the special case
of a fully credible commitment of FM. However, the resulting solution alone does
not seem sufficient to solve the problem adequately since national representatives
have an influence on the decision within their responsibilities in the European
Council.
The bargaining game has the following sequential structure:
0: "Nature" draws the type of FM. In the complete information approach of section 4
the result is common knowledge: IG knows FM’s type. In the incomplete
information extension of section 6, however, IG does not know the result but only
the probability distribution of FM’s type.
A: IG has to move: Either he accepts or rejects consolidation. If he accepts, the game
is over and consolidation has been achieved.
B: If IG rejects consolidation, FM has the next move. Either he gives in and EMU
starts without consolidation or he sticks to his preannouncement and postpones
EMU.
C: If EMU is postponed, "nature" moves and with a probability θ EMU fails
permanently and the game is over without EMU and without consolidation. With
the probability (1 - θ) the game will go on and after a delay of one period it
restarts at A.
"Nature's" move in step C can be interpreted as the reaction of international financial
markets to a postponement decision. If a postponement leads to massive turbulences
on foreign exchange and bond markets this could mean EMU's failure for the
foreseeable future.
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 It is an unresolved political and legal dispute whether a postponement of EMU altogether has
ever been a real possibility.
7Payoffs for all possible outcomes for both players are given in the following table
with κ, λ, σ,  τ ≥ 0.





No EMU and no
consolidation
FM κ + λ κ 0
IG σ - τ σ 0
These payoffs have to be interpreted as present values of all future
improvements/deterioration resulting from a change. With "no EMU and no
consolidation" the initial situation remains unchanged, thus the payoffs are 0. The
other outcomes imply changes. For FM the outcome "EMU with consolidation" is
preferred over "EMU without consolidation", for IG vice versa. The present value
interpretation can be illustrated for τ which measures the losses the IG has to endure
with consolidation. This consolidation may comprise permanent structural changes
in the fiscal institutions, resulting in a permanent reduction of subsidies - for
example through the Pact for Stability and Growth. τ is the present value of all of
IG’s future losses through cuts in subsidies resulting from consolidation. σ , on the
other hand, is the present value of all gains resulting from EMU for IG. These gains
may result for example from growth effects or savings in transactions costs due to
the introduction of a European currency.
For FM, κ represents his EMU benefits. These benefits might both comprise
economic and political elements. Part of the economic benefits are growth effects or
- from the point of view of a former high inflation country - advantages stemming
from the introduction of a  stable currency regime. Political benefits are present if
EMU is part of the general political programme of the incumbent government. λ
stands for the benefits FM can realise in case of a successful consolidation. It can be
left open whether in this model FM is a benevolent agent whose utility function is
identical with society's welfare function or whether he is a politician maximising
some kind of individual objective function. Important, however, is the assumption
that FM is benefiting from consolidation. In the situation of critical levels of open
and off-budget debt this is plausible both for a benevolent agent and a politician
maximising his individual utility.
If these payoffs are not realised in the initial period they have to be discounted,










  with i = FM, IG and ρ i  the rate of time preference. θ is the above
mentioned probability of EMU’s final failure after a postponement resulting, for
9example, from capital market reactions to such a decision. Due to this definition
0 1≤ ≤δ i .
The structure of this sequential bargaining game is similar to the "war of attrition"
by Alesina and Drazen (1991). Each player would benefit from the other giving up
and thus ending the game. Due to discounting, any delay of the game’s end is costly
for both sides but these costs could be compensated for by reaching the preferred
outcome.
In the following diagram the extensive form of the consolidation game is presented.




















4 No EMU Postponement under Complete Information
In this section the game is played under the assumption of complete information:
FM’s type is known to IG. The starting point of the analysis is the commitment
solution. If FM could commit himself beyond doubt on his postponement threat then
the outcome of the consolidation game is easily derived. This case would be given if
the European Council’s determination to base its EMU membership decision on a
strict interpretation of the criteria would be fully credible. In this case the national
FM could hint to an undeniable external constraint.
In this case IG has the choice to get either 0 (no EMU and no consolidation) or σ - τ
(EMU and consolidation). IG will decide in favour of (against) EMU whenever σ - τ
> 0 (< 0). If for IG EMU’s advantages would not at least balance the costs of
consolidation, then even under perfect commitment FM has no chance to win the
game. Under these circumstances a postponement of EMU simply is no threat to IG.
Proposition 1: A necessary (not a sufficient) condition for the success of the EMU
postponement threat in budgetary bargaining is that the opponents of consolidation
remain EMU winners even if EMU is combined with consolidation (σ - τ >  0).
Some anecdotal illustration: It is not surprising that the German government failed
to succeed in substantially cutting back subsidies for coal mining in its attempt to
fulfil the deficit criterion. German coal mining is heavily protected from
international competition and therefore this industry would not expect substantial
advantages from EMU. However, the EMU postponement threat is a potential
weapon dealing with lobbies such as export oriented industries that are clear Euro-
winners.
Proposition 1 shows also that FM’s credibility can be undermined by increasing IG’s
consolidation costs. An example: The Pact for Stability and Growth has been
designed to transform the fiscal criteria from a temporarily effective limitation into a
permanently binding one. A temporary cut of subsidies limited to the EMU
qualification years is transformed into a cut of subsidies of a permanent nature. This
institutional change could mean for some interest groups a dramatic increase of
consolidation costs changing the payoff of the EMU-consolidation-outcome from
the positive into the negative area. In this case the postponement of EMU ceases to
be a threat to this interest group. Thus, intensifying consolidation pressure can erode
the bargaining power of FM.
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Turning now to the case where there is no exogenous commitment, a necessary (but
not sufficient) condition for the credibility of the postponement threat can be
derived. FM could only be credible at least for one round of the game if the best
possible outcome of a postponement is better for FM than an immediate
capitulation. In order to avoid an immediate collapse of FM’s credibility, the
following relation must hold: δ λκFM > +1 1/ ( ) . This condition ensures that from
FM’s point of view the EMU-consolidation-outcome after a postponement of one
period is better than EMU immediately without consolidation. This is not a
sufficient condition for credibility because it is not clear whether after a
postponement FM can carry through consolidation immediately.
Proposition 2: FM’s credibility is endangered by a large time preference ( ρ FM ), an
increasing probability of EMU’s final failure after a postponement (θ) and a large
payoff from EMU relative to the payoff from consolidation (κ λ ). A necessary (not a
sufficient) condition for the credibility of FM’s postponement threat is
δ λκFM > +1 1/ ( ) .
This result also has important real world implications. In the run up to the EMU
memebership decision many politicians have assured that any postponement would
imply a failure of EMU altogether. Translated into the model this means that θ is
approaching unity and δi zero. If this is the case, FM’s threat has no credibility at all.
Thus any attempt to use the EMU-postponement threat for consolidation is senseless
if there is the general belief that a postponement of EMU leads to a failure with
certainty. Note that δ is zero for both FM and IG in this case but that this
nevertheless puts FM into the weaker position. FM has the second mover
disadvantage: FM has to decide over EMU postponement after IG has opted to resist
consolidation. Because with δFM equal zero IG knows that FM will not postpone, IG
does not risk anything by opposing consolidation. Apart from this there is the
standard argument for a specifically lower discount factor of FM compared to IG
factor: Politicians tend to discount the future heavily facing the next election with an
uncertain outcome.
So far only necessary conditions for FM’s credibility have been stated. The
derivation of a sufficient condition for FM’s credibility amounts to the search for the
equilibrium of this game. The solution can be found by looking for the maximum
number of periods ( t* ) each side would be willing to wait in order to end up with
the preferred outcome and to avoid immediate capitulation. This calculus is
described in Figure 1. t* is defined to be the number of periods for which a player
12
due to discounting is indifferent between immediately giving up and accepting the
unfavourable outcome or enduring delay and getting the preferred outcome.












According to this calculus the maximum possible length of delay each player could
hold out is given by the following equations:
(1)     t FM FM* ln( ) / ln= +
κ
κ λ δ
(2)     t IG IG* ln( ) / ln= −σ τσ δ
FM’s threat will be only credible if he could stand longer than IG the discounting
costs of an EMU delay. For both sides any strategy implying to hold out longer than
t i*  would not be internally consistent because an immediate capitulation would be
preferable.
In deciding who is the winner in the consolidation game the sequential structure of
the game has to be taken into account. Whenever IG decides to be tough he can
speculate that FM will give up in the same period. Whenever FM decides to be
tough he knows for sure that there will be at least a further delay of one period
13
before the preferred result could possibly be realised. Therefore FM will win the
game only if the following relation holds: 7
 (3)     t tFM IG* *> +1
Proposition 3: A sufficient condition for the credibility of FM’s postponement threat
is that FM could hold out longer than IG until the discounting costs of a delay make
a capitulation in the first period preferable (relation (3) must be fulfilled).
Proposition 3 comprises propositions 1 and 2. However, it additionally relates FM’s
to IG’s characteristics.
It is an important feature of this setting that due to complete information a
postponement of EMU might be used as a threat but will never occur. Since both
sides know exactly the opponent’s characteristics and his t* relative to the own, they
see from the beginning who will be able to stay out longer. If one side knows
initially to be the loser in the end, it will prefer giving up immediately due to the
discounting costs of any delay. Thus any equilibrium where the weaker side’s
strategy would involve provoking a postponement and capitulating in a later stage
would not constitute a Nash equilibrium.8 Either the credible postponement threat
will make the IG to accept consolidation immediately or IG will resist an incredible
threat and FM will give in.
Proposition 4: Under complete information it will not come to a postponement of
EMU. The weaker side will give up in the initial period in order to avoid the
discounting costs that reduce EMU’s benefits.
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 It is abstracted from the problem of non-integer outcomes. Taking account of this would not be
efficient: more formal complexity would not be accompanied by more insights.
8
 This is a standard result of this war of attrition type of model under complete information. See
Alesina and Drazen (1991, p. 1180).
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5 An Indicator of Bargaining Strength
So far only pure strategies have been considered and this restriction will continue
also in the incomplete information case of the next section. Here a mixed strategy
equilibrium will be calculated with the limited purpose to derive an indicator of
inherent bargaining strength. For game theorists this might appear to be an
unconventional interpretation of a mixed strategy equilibrium. It is, however, a
helpful way to illustrate how the relative bargaining strength of both parties depends
on payoffs and discount factors.
A mixed strategy implies that in a given situation players will decide in favour of
one among different actions at random and with a given probability. In the
consolidation game the following assumptions are made: Whenever IG is to act he
will fight consolidation with a probability of ψ and he will give in with probability
(1-ψ). Whenever it is up to FM to react, he will decide in favour of (against
postponement) with a probability of ϕ (1-ϕ, respectively).
It is in the nature of such a mixed equilibrium setting that both sides must be
indifferent between their available choices whenever they are to move (Rasmusen,
1994, 67-91). Otherwise a mixed strategy can not be the best available strategy. This
indifference postulate allows to derive the mixed strategy equilibrium (see appendix
for details):
(4)     ψ κλ δ* ( )= − +1
1 1
FM
     with     ∂ψ ∂δ
*
FM
> 0 ,∂ψ ∂ κ λ
*
( ) < 0












     with     ∂ϕ ∂δ
*
IG
> 0 ,∂ϕ ∂ σ τ
*
( ) < 0
A mixed strategy equilibrium is only viable if both sides base their decisions on
exactly these probabilities concerning the opponent’s toughness. Any deviation from
these probabilities would not support a mixed equilibrium any longer because the
indifference postulate would be hurt.
These equilibrium supporting probabilities of the opponent can be interpreted as
indicators concerning the strength of  the own position. The higher ψ* - the
equilibrium supporting probability of IG to be tough - the stronger FM’s position.
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The higher ϕ* - the equilibrium supporting probability of FM to be tough - the
stronger IG’s position.
If ψ were only a bit smaller than ψ* then FM would clearly opt for toughness. To
put it differently: If FM has inherent characteristics putting him into a strong
position there needs to be a high probability of IG to be tough in order to make FM
indifferent between a tough and a soft stance. The equivalent statement holds for ϕ
and the characteristics of IG. This reasoning explains the seeming paradox that an
increasing equilibrium probability of the opponent’s toughness serves as an indicator
of increasing own strength.
There is nothing in equations (4) and (5) restricting ϕ* and ψ* to be in the range
between 0 and 1 and thus to be consistent with the probability interpretation. A
result out of this range and thus inconsistent with the probability interpretation
means that the indifference postulate can not be fulfilled - there is no admissible
solution. Even this outcome, however, can be interpreted in terms of credibility: A
value of ψ* below 0 (above 1) indicates the absolute inferiority (superiority) of FM.
The equivalent statement holds for ϕ* and IG's credibility.
With this background the above comparative static results of the mixed strategy
equilibrium can be interpreted easily. For both players heavy discounting - a small
individual δ - weakens the own position. For FM a high EMU payoff relative to the
benefits from consolidation is a burden for credibility. The same holds for IG and a
high EMU payoff relative to the costs of consolidation.
6 Incomplete information and EMU postponement
Up to now it has been assumed that both sides know each other’s characteristics
with certainty. This not very realistic assumption is modified in this section. Due to
the complexity of the political process in regard to any EMU postponement decision
it seems appropriate to attach an information disadvantage to IG in the consolidation
game in the following sense: IG is uncertain about FM’s payoff resulting from
consolidation, λ. IG does not know with certainty the opponent’s degree of inherent
determination. The higher λ the stronger FM’s bargaining position. IG knows the
probability distribution of λ but not the actual value. Contrary to IG, FM has full
information on both his own and the opponent’s characteristics.
The probability density of λ is given by the following simple function:
16
(6)     f
T






  für =
 für 1
   with λT  > λS
Thus λT  stands for a ‘tough’ and λS for a ‘soft’ FM. The modified game tree is
depicted in the following diagram. Initially ‘nature moves’ and chooses a type of
FM (step 0 in section 3). The result of this move is not known to IG. When IG has to
decide the first time between opposition and capitulation he does not know  whether
he is acting at node X or Y. In the game theoretical terminology: Both nodes belong
to the same information set. In the course of the bargaining IG can possibly draw
conclusions from the behaviour of FM and adjust his prior belief concerning FM’s
characteristics.
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Again, as in the complete information setting, both sides’ maximum tolerable EMU
delay - t* - is the clue to the solution. However, different to the complete
information setting, t*FM  is FM’s private knowledge. Even if FM is of the tough
type he can not credibly communicate this to IG because a soft FM would have an
incentive to lie and send out the same message of toughness. Thus only FM’s
behaviour can possibly enable IG to draw conclusions. In the beginning of the
bargaining game IG’s prior belief E0 is the following:
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Depending on the value of E0 (t* FM) - which through equations (1) and (7) in turn
depends on the general knowledge values of λT, λS  - and depending on  t*IG - given
by equation (2) - the following constellations are possible:
Case A: Absolute strategic superiority of FM
(8)     t*IG + 1 < t*FM (λS) < t*FM (λT)
In this case IG will not try to oppose consolidation because he knows to be in the
weaker position even if the opponent is of the soft type. EMU starts immediately
and consolidation is carried through.
Case B: Absolute strategic inferiority of FM
(9)     t*IG + 1 >  t*FM (λT) > t*FM (λS)
In this case IG will oppose consolidation successfully because independent of FM’s
type IG can stand any conflict longer than FM and both sides are aware of this. As in
case A there will be no postponement.
Case C: Potentially separating constellation
(10)     t*FM (λT) > t*IG + 1 > t*FM (λS)
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With this constellation a tough FM will be in a superior and a soft FM in an inferior
strategic position. While both preceding cases lead to a pooling equilibrium in the
sense that both types of FM will act identically, case C is potentially separating. The
restriction "potentially" is necessary because FM will only be forced to reveal his
true type if IG actually opposes consolidation. If IG opposes consolidation the soft
FM will give in and the tough FM will postpone EMU.  A risk-neutral IG will
provoke this self-revelation only if
(11)     t*IG + 1 > E0(t*FM)
Thus, case C has to be differentiated further into two subcases: case C.1, where
relation (11) holds, and case C.2, where it does not.
In C.1 it comes to the outcome that IG will not oppose consolidation being aware
that he would be able to win the game against a soft FM. This stems from the fact
that IG expects to be weaker and that IG loses if he provokes a strong FM: He incurs
the discounting costs of a postponement without a chance to avoid consolidation.
Thus IG will avoid conflict if the probability of FM to be tough is large - even if IG
would win against a soft FM.
Under the constellation C.2 (depicted in Figure 4) IG  will risk conflict because -
based on his prior belief - he expects to be stronger than FM. After this move, FM
will reveal his true type through a postponement (tough FM) or capitulation (soft
FM). After FM’s move IG will correct his belief according to FM’s self-revelation
and the game is over: Facing a strong FM with certainty, IG has no incentive to
oppose any longer. With a soft FM the game is finished by FM himself through his
capitulation.9
                                          
9
 The maximum possible delay of one period seems to be in contradiction to similar sequential
bargaining models such as Sobel/Takahashi (1983) where longer delays are possible. The
explaining difference between the models is that in Sobel/Takahshi a longer delay can be
beneficial for one side through a relation between delay and payoff-structure. This is different
here, where the decision concerning EMU and consolidation is all or nothing and the payoffs
are - apart from discounting - not influenced by the length of delay.
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These results can be summarised in the following way:
Proposition 5: If there is incomplete information in the sense that FM’s
characteristics are no common knowledge a postponement is possible. The
postponement allows FM to demonstrate his inherent bargaining strength to be
higher than IG had expected a priori.
Proposition 6: In the incomplete information setting of the consolidation game, in
spite of the infinite bargaining horizon, there can not be more than one
postponement.
7 Conclusion and Outlook
The results of this specific consolidation game are helpful to clarify the conditions
for the effectiveness of a certain type of conditionality in a more general way: If a
government’s opponents do not give up resistance to reforms, they are punished by a
delay of economic integration. The above results hint on the necessary constellation
for such conditionality to work: First, government’s opponents must have an interest
in integration. The benefit from integration for the interest group in question must be
large enough to compensate for the losses that are associated with giving up
resistance to reform.
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Second, a government using that kind of conditionality must be inherently credible.
Credibility is seriously undermined if the government itself is heavily eager for
integration. That is why - in the EMU context - it is inconsistent to convey the two
messages of the following type (as it has been the case for example in Germany
before the EMU qualification): "There will be a strict interpretation of the criteria:
3.0 equals 3.0" and "a postponement of EMU will have very negative consequences
for the European economies".  These two statements are not consistent and an
interest group with rational expectations will recognise this. Thus, every government
thinking about using this conditionality should on the one hand be clear about this
precondition for credibility. On the other hand it should try to convey a consistent
picture. A statement like "3.0 equals 3.0" must be paralleled by the statement "a
postponement of EMU will only have minor negative consequences" - otherwise this
kind of conditionality is senseless. In the end the government will lose its face.
A further insight from the consolidation game is worth to be marked: There is
nothing endogenous in this type of bargaining that would lead to a long
postponement or even a complete failure of integration. Under complete information
there can not be any delay and the maximum possible delay under incomplete
information is one period. This one period delay helps the government to prove its
strategic superiority. Thus the hypothesis, that a delay of integration leads to failure
necessarily, is not grounded on the strategic aspects of the consolidation game and
must be motivated differently.
A standard proposition in the context of fiscal restrictions is that capital markets
discipline budgetary policy. This general proposition does not hold in the specific
context of this type of conditionality. If there is a high probability of EMU’s final
failure in case of delay resulting from capital market effects, then a government’s
credibility is destroyed and this conditionality will not work. Of course, these capital
market effects are not analysed at all in the above model and it is an open question
whether a delay will produce final failure with a high probability.
This model hints on relations that are open to empirical testing. EU countries facing
the EMU qualification process have been in different positions concerning the
credibility of the postponement threat. Since EMU has never been realistic without
Germany and France and possibly some other core countries, "postponement" for
these countries would imply postponing EMU altogether. For the peripheral
countries, however, "postponement" would simply stand for exclusion from a
punctually starting core EMU. It is plausible to assume that the latter kind of threat
has always been more credible than the former. It could be tested whether the
consolidation performance of the qualification period shows a corresponding
pattern, i.e. larger consolidation progress in the periphery than in the core countries.
A further consequence of the above model open for empirical testing concerns the
structure of consolidation measures. The model shows that the postponement threat
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should be more effective facing EMU winners - for example export oriented
industries - and is ineffective dealing with EMU losers.
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Appendix: Derivation of mixed strategy equilibrium
The indifference postulate implies that from the point of view of each side the
expected payoff from being soft must equal the expected payoff from being tough.
Since the payoff in case of capitulation is certain, probabilities are only relevant in
case of toughness. The following relations, where E is the expectation operator,
must hold in a mixed strategy equilibrium:
For IG: σ τ ϕ σ ϕδ− = − +( ) (1 IG E payoff in case of FM s opposition      ’  )
For FM: κ δ ψ κ λ ψ= − + +FM E payoff in case of IG s continuing opposition(( )( ) ( ’ ))1        
Because of the infinite structure of the bargaining situation, the last terms in both
equations seem complex. However, due to the indifference postulate also in the next
period both parties would be neutral between giving up at once and further
resistance. Thus both equations can be simplified to:
For IG: σ τ ϕ σ ϕδ σ τ− = − + −( ) )1 IG  (
For FM: κ δ ψ κ λ ψ κ= − + +FM (( )( ) )1  
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